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Benson: Benson: Procedural Approach

Comment
A Procedural Approach to the

Problem of the Right
I. INTRODUCTION

Modem society is characterized by heightened complexity in the degree
of interdependence among its members. As societies advance, courts are
increasingly called upon to strike an appropriate balance among the interests
of individuals, society, and government. This Comment addresses certain
problems of constitutional jurisprudence that arise when courts attempt to
strike that balance. Several cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment will
be discussed. They present useful illustrations of the nature of conflicts that
arise among societal actors.'
Four cases will be analyzed in this Comment. In Jacobsonv. Massachu2
setts, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that required citizens
to receive smallpox vaccinations. In Bowers v. Hardwick,3 the Court
considered the constitutional validity of a statute that criminalized private
consensual homosexual sodomy. Griswold v. Connecticut4 explored the
validity of a statute criminalizing contraception, while Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians& Gynecologists5 dealt with a statute that
imposed limits on procuring an abortion. When confronted with legislative
acts that encroach upon individual autonomy, the Court is forced to determine
the extent to which moral convictions, rather than the practical realities of
coexistence, might limit the sphere of individual liberty enjoyed by citizens.
The framers sought, in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, to create
within the American system of justice the optimal balance among the rights
of individuals, societal majorities, and government. American people have
developed a philosophical attachment to these documents. The documents
provide ideological as well as structural stability to the American model of
government; they embody the organic law of this nation. The interpretation
of the organic law must yield a balance among the competing actors that will
be perceived as representing the "right" balance. The concept of the right

implies that which is legitimate in the opinion of the actors whose rights are

1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (citizens challenged a state statute that
criminalized private consensual homosexual sodomy); Thomburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (citizens challenged a state statute that
burdened a woman's choice to have an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(citizens challenged a state statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (citizen challenged a state statute requiring smallpox
vaccinations).
2. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
3. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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balanced. In modem American society, substantive conceptions of the
goodness or morality of 1his balance may be reflected in the idea of the right.
This Comment explores an alternative interpretation of the right based
upon contract theory as formulated by John Rawls6 and advanced by Michel
Rosenfeld Contract theorists have posited a theory of the right in which

"the right," the optimal balance among societal actors, is conceptualized as the
product of a contractual process among individuals regarding their association
and government.' Rawls has refined this theory, postulating a contractual
process in which the contracting parties manifest only those characteristics and
motivations common to all individuals.9 Within Rawls' framework, the
concept of the right constitutes the idea that despite competing conceptions of
substantive legitimacy, individuals, through an objective and fair process of
agreement, may determine a set of principles for guiding their organization
into societal units.' ° The product of this process is a theoretical construct
from which one may develop the parameters of the autonomy enjoyed by
societal actors" and achieve the proper balance among the interests of
individuals, society, and government.
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE RIGHT
If kings and demigods, clothed in a spiritual imperative, were the order
of the day, and citizens were therefore susceptible to being awed into
unquestioning and reverent obedience to the pronouncement of rules, the
concept of law would be indistinguishable from that of the right. Recognition
of the responsibility of mere mortals for the pronouncement of law makes the
concept of right an issue. There are two components of such a mortal order
which contribute to the problem of the concept of the right. The first is the
necessity and utility of coexistence; 2 the second is the individual nature of
humankind."

6. The material on Rawls' theory is taken from his book, A Theory of Justice. While he
develops an extensive theory, only the basic theory of procedural fairness is considered in this
Comment.
7. Rosenfeld's article, ContractandJustice: The Relation Between ClassicalContractLaw
andSocial ContractTheory, 70 IOWA L. REv. 769 (1985), provides the basic contract theory for

this Comment.
8. Id. at 782, 878.
9. See infra notes 59, 61.
10. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE (1971). Rawls' explanation of the right represents
the product of a procedural model: "the concept of something's being right is the same as, or
better, may be replaced by, the concept of its being in accordance with the principles that inthe
original position would be acknowledged to apply to things of its kind." Id. The concept of the
original position will be briefly discussed infra. See generally RAWLS, supra, at 118-83.
11. See generallyRAWLS, supra note 10, at 1-192; Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 850-63, 878.
12. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 128; Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 779.
13. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 46; Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 777.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/9

2

1993]

Benson:
Approach
OF Procedural
THE RIGHT
THEBenson:
PROBLEM

The necessity and utility of coexistence may be derived from a "theoretical construct," such as the state of nature. 4 The concept of the state

14. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 850-63. Rosenfeld considers the formulations of the state
of nature in the works of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. He initially notes that Locke assumed
that, rather than constituting a theory, the state of nature was an actual historical event. Id. at
849n.363. Rosenfeldpoints out the common groundofthethreephilosophers: "Each individual
in the state of nature is primarily, if not entirely, motivated by self-interest." Id. at 851-52.
Consider the three philosophers' various formulations of self-interest and its role in the
development of humans from the state of nature to civil society. Hobbes' theory conceives of
self-interest as fear, which provides the impetus to social organization.
The Right of Nature... is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power,
as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own
Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
And because the condition of Man,... is a condition of Warre of every one
against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and
there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving
his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a
Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this

naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any
man,... of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live ....
THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 86, 87 (A.R. Waller ed., 1904).
Locke conceived of civil society as a way of preserving individual natural rights, most
notably the individual's interest in property and in life.
Ifman in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, ifhe be absolute lord
of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why
will he part with his freedom, this empire, id subject himself to the dominion and
control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the
state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every
man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the
enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This
makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and
continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to
join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general
name-property.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREA nSES OF Crvi. GOVERNMENT 179 (1960).
Rousseau also posits that self-interest is the impetus for leaving the state of nature for civil
society. His conception of self-interest has two components. One component stems from the
problems posed by conflicts of interest in the state ofnature. Civil society, he thinks, will secure
freedom for individuals that was not achievable in the state of nature.
[I]t becomes manifestly false to assert that individuals make any real
renunciation by the social contract; indeed, as a result of the contract they find
themselves in a situation preferable in real terms to that which prevailed before;
instead of an alienation, they have profitably exchanged an uncertain and precarious
life for a better and more secure one; they have exchanged natural independence for
freedom, the power to destroy others for the enjoyment of their own security; they
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of nature has been thus defined:
From the premise that the individual is prior to society, the legitimacy of
the social order can presumably be established through the systematic
dismantlement of the existing social apparatus. This process extracts and
isolates what is irreducibly and 'purely' individual and provides the ultimate
basis from which the universe of legitimate social relations can be
reconstructed. This realm of pure and irreducible individuality is called the
state of nature.' 5

In the state of nature all have equal right to all things; thus "no one has a
secure and recognized right to anything."' 6 The significance of the state of
nature construct is that it enables an understanding that "the individual in the
state of nature eventually realizes that cooperation and association, rather than
antagonism and isolation, may better serve his or her own self-interest."' 7
An alternative postulation of the necessity and utility of coexistence arises
from the reality of modem existence: modem society faces a mushrooming
world population, constrained by finite land resources and scarcity of goods,

have exchanged their own strength which others might oyercome for a right which

the social union makes invincible.
RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 77 (1968). The second component of
Rousseau's conception of self-interest involves an individual's recognition of the common
JEAN-JACQUES

interest, which stems from an innate moral pressure that cannot be realized in the state of nature.
See id. at 29.

15. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 850. Individualism is the premise upon which contract
theory is based. Id. at 776-79. Rosenfeld notes an alternative construct of human nature as

deriving from membership in a group:
While it may be impossible to separate the purely individual from the purely

social with respect to any individual member of an established social order, it does
not thereby follow that the interests of the individual cannot be distinguished from

those of the group.... More generally, while the individual may not be ultimately
separable from his or her society, there may be individual concerns that are not only
distinguishable from, but also antagonistic to, the concerns that relate to the group.
Accordingly, individualism's claim that the individual is prior to society may suggest
that individual concerns generally take precedence over collective ones, or, at least,
that collective aims cannot be freely pursued in disregard of individual aims.
Id. at 850.
Some philosophers take issue with the concept that individuals have a necessary and
determined nature, contending rather that human nature is a function of social contexts.
Human nature is not an abstract fixed, trancendental (sic) entity, nor is it something
which can be created anew by an arbitrary decision of a free individual. In each
historical epoch there is a general structure which is a crystallization of the whole
past history of human praxis. This structure is a concrete dynamic totality which
underlies all more specific determinants-those of class, race, nation, religion,
profession, and individual character.... We have to move within these natural,
social, and cultural limits.
MIHAmo MARKOVIC, FROM AFFLUENCE TO PRAXs 35 (1968).
16. Rosenfeld, supranote 7, at 791.
17. Id. at 851.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/9

4

1993]

Benson: Benson: Procedural Approach
THE PROBLEM OF THE RIGHT

organized within a comprehensive political structure comprised of subunits of
increasing number and complexity. 8 Indeed, it is within these modem
conditions of coexistence that the optimal balance among societal actors is
sought to be achieved.
The individual nature of humankind requires some elaboration. It is
assumed, and indeed such an assumption seems not unsound, 9 that individuals are motivated by self-interest. At its most basic level, self-interest implies
a focus on such things as survival, comfort and material goods. Certainly,
however, the concept of self-interest encompasses more than these basic
pursuits. Self-interest may also include concern for the interests of those who
are in some way an extension of oneself, such as family and friends. Selfinterest may be even broader, prompting the pursuit of spiritual and philosophical understanding of oneself as an individual and oneself in the context of
society. Thus, while it is true that a person may sometimes act in a way that
does not further her own basic interests, the activity may still be understood
as one that furthers her philosophical or spiritual interests. Further, the
concept of human individual nature implicates a reasoning process in which
judgments as to the value of ideas are filtered through one's awareness of
self.2"
The intersection of the necessity and utility of coexistence with human
individual nature forces the development of a theoretical framework for
conceptualizing and implementing the concept of the right. The need for such
a framework stems from the requirement of popular legitimacy. Popular
legitamacy fosters ideological and organizational stability and thus, system
perpetuation. It is a function of ideological, emotional, and economic
investment in existing structures, as well as the realization of vulnerability in
the international system. System perpetuation, however, cannot be ensured,
nor can it be philosophically defended as a goal, independent of the system's
foundation in some conception of the right.
Substantive conceptions of the right involve subjective determinations as
to the validity of using moral, ethical, and religious criteria as standards for

18. WORLD ALMANAC 552-54 (1990).
19. See supra note 14.
20. Even the very act of articulating a theory ofjustice necessarily contaminates the pure

and undistilled idea because of the impact of the speaker's personality, the imprecision of
language, and the impurity inherent in the purposes behind the decision to communicate the
theory. This idea was well captured in a poem written by the Russian poet, Fedor Tyutchev:

Silentium
Be silent, hide yourself, and conceal your feelings and your dreams. Let them rise
and set in the depths of your soul, silently, like stars in the night; contemplate them
with admiration, and be silent.
How will the heart express itself? How will another understand you. Will he
understand what it is that you live by?... A thought that is spoken is a falsehood;
by stirring up the springs you will cloud them: drink of them, and be silent.
Know how to live within yourself: there is in your soul a whole world of
mysterious and enchanted thoughts; they will be drowned by the noise without;
daylight will drive them away: listen to their singing, and be silent.
THE PENGUN BOOK OF RussIAN VERsE 132-33 (Dimitri Obolensky ed., 1965).
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judging the legitimacy of theory and structure. The very subjectivity of these
standards implicates their inadequacy, for stability requires legitimacy that
holds universal appeal. Thus the essence of the problem of the right is that
law must find its legitimacy in a procedural approach developed within the
philosophical confines of a system in which the demands of coexistence must
be integrated with those of individuality.2'

An articulation of the substantive and procedural derivation of law that
is consistent with these demands must distinguish law created by government

and law that creates government (organic law). Within the system of laws
created by government, the subjective appeal of the substantive provisions of
legislative and judicial laws, policies, and rules (positive law) constitutes the
primary source of popular legitimacy. A universally acceptable theory of
organic law, however, is predicated upon the primacy of the process leading
to its development, such that universal acceptance is derived from the validity
of the process rather than from the substantive result of the process. The
distinction reveals the very limited usefulness of substantive conceptions of the
right as a basis for the legitimacy of organic law.
Within the framework of law created by government, citizens' substantive

precepts are the source of popular legitimacy for law, while procedure is
merely a vehicle by which such substantive precepts are put into operation.
These substantive conceptions are derived from organic law and are embodied
in positive law, public policies, and the political structure. At first glance it

might appear inconsistent to posit that substantive conceptions of right can be
determined through reference to organic law. The validity of the process
culminating in organic law is, indeed, the focus within the theoretical
framework of the procedural model; this model contemplates a process of
agreement untainted by individual substantive conceptual biases. It is clear,
though, that the agreement that results from this process is substantive in its
provisions. The function, then, of the focus on its procedural derivation is to
define the scope of the substantive agreement such that the scope of the

organic law, and the positive law derived therefrom, is circumscribed by
consideration of human individual nature and of the reasons necessitating and

facilitating coexistence. The conditions characterizing a process that creates
a universally valid law product provide the limitations on the scope of the
grant of power in the substantive provisions of organic law. These limiting
conditions represent the intersection of human individual nature and the
necessity and utility of coexistence.
Within the framework of law that creates government, there is no role for
substantive considerations beyond those basic limiting conditions. Only a
procedural derivation is consistent with both factors. The substantive reach,
then, of the organic law must be derived from the procedural foundations of
societal organization. Substantive considerations are simply untenable within

the procedural framework; man's individual nature will produce a variety of
conceptions of the right,' yet no mechanism exists for validly choosing

21. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 11; see Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 772.
22. See RAWLS, supra note 10, at 40-45; Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 778-79.
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among them. Any method of choice, for example majority rule, is itself
necessarily based upon substantive values which may not be uniformly shared.
To attain popular appeal, the validity of the process must be equated with
an idea to which people attach philosophical significance. Ideas, however,
carry substantive connotations. Once the conceptualizing idea is chosen, it
must be stripped of popular meaning and redefined. Rawls hypothesized that
popular conceptions of the right grow out of constructs of justice.' Justice
is capable of diverse and varying interpretations, both procedural 'and
substantive in nature. The term "justice" generally is used as if it were an
independent, neutral, and fundamental conception of the right. Yet justice is
popularly conceptualized in the context of more subjective dogmas such as
morality and religion, and in the context of various paradigms that are born
of and thus restricted by existing theoretical and organizational structures, such
as legality.24 Further, "justice" has no consistent definition within the context
of political theory and organization. A semanticist might take issue with such
characterizations and maintain that while they might be consistent with the
notion of what is "just," "just" and "justice" connote very different ideas. Here
the distinction is irrelevant, however, for it is one of academia rather than of
popular experience.

Definitions of "just" may be examined in order to

illuminate popular understanding of the concept of justice.
Definitions of "just" and "justice" include "conforming to or consonant
with what is legal or lawful,"22 "adhering to high moral standards,"26
"morally riht," "legally valid," "an attribute of God, of his laws and
judgments," and "the abstract principle by which right and wrong are
defined."2 Conceiving of justice as a substantive creature merely begs the
relevant question insofar as it is defined by reference to legality, and further
constitutes simply another subjectively-divined conception of the right merely
coequal with such constructs as morality and religion that are used to define
it. Thus in its substantive formulation, justice is inconsistent with the
background conditions implicating the problem of the right.
Justice is capable of procedural interpretations as well. Thus it has been
defined as the "proper administration of laws,"" "the constant and perpetual
disposition of legal matters or disputes to render every man his due,"" "the
administration of law,"32 and "fair, even-handed and impartial in acting or

judging."33 These procedural formulations of justice are likewise inadequate
to validate justice as a philosophically defensible conception of the right, in

23. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 3-4.
24. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 863 (6th ed. 1990).
26. READER'S DIGEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 735 (1977).

27. Id
28. Id.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (6th ed. 1990).
READER'S DIGEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 735 (1977).

Id.
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that the procedural model thus defined is clearly envisioned within an existing

legal and political order and that order's underlying theoretical assumptions.
A theory of procedure, as a foundation for conceiving of the rightness of

organic law, must predate any such organizational and theoretical framework,
otherwise it is necessarily subsumed within a system of substantive conception.
Justice, as a distinct and independent substantive concept, is derived from
the organizational and theoretical constructs embodied in an organic law
product. Justice, then, as a conception of the right, can be the foundation for
interpreting the content and scope of the organic law product, but only in light
of the process which generated that product. 4 It is the process which
illuminates the interpretation of the product. The underlying concern, then,
is the legitimacy of that process. An application of this theory within the
American system of government would result in justice no longer being a
function of subjective agreement or disagreement with official interpretations
of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Majority politics would play no role
in constitutional jurisprudence. Justice, as a concept that enables popular
legitimacy, would represent the boundaries within which organic law and law
created by government may operate.
Within the context of the process toward societal organization and the
development of organic law, the concept of justice, as the embodiment of the
right, must be defined in terms of procedural integrity. It must constitute a
process that accommodates the intersection of the factors that contribute to the
problem of the right: man's individual nature and the necessity and utility of
coexistence. Justice, then, in the context of the process of conceiving organic
law, may be defined as that process by which organic law is made to achieve
a balance between the demands of coexistence and those of man's individual
nature." It can be argued that human individual nature and coexistence are
not coequal concepts that require balancing, in that human individual nature
is something innate, while coexistence is born of a person's appreciation of
external circumstances, and as such, coexistence is of an inferior status to that
of human individual nature. However, once coexistence became a pursuit of
humankind, a conflict was created, because coexistence requires some
compromise of human individual nature. Thus each concept must sacrifice a
portion of its purity in the process.
III. THE PROCEDURAL MODEL
Procedural integrity, by reconciling the nature of the individual and the
demands of coexistence, constitutes the foundation of a theory of justice that
posits justice as contract, or alternatively, justice as fairness.36 Justice as
contract is consistent with man's individual nature, in that it contemplates
organization by mutual consent.37 Justice as contract is also consistent with

34.
35.
36.
37.

See generally RAWLS, supra, note 10; Rosenfeld, supra note 7.
Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 779-80.
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 11.
Id. at 13; Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 782.
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the necessity and utility of coexistence; the concept of contract implicitly
recognizes human interdependence,38 the fundamental basis of coexistence.
At this point it must be noted that, while within an existing organic law
framework, cooperation may be based on both individual and common good,
one cannot similarly conclude that within an environment pre-dating the
development of organic law individuals are motivated by more than selfinterest.39 At that stage of development no universal conception of a
common group exists, beyond those groups, such as families, that themselves
emanate from self-interest. Thus consideration of the common good
necessarily relies on aspects of individual character too subjective to constitute
a useful part of procedural theory. Proponents of justice as fairness envision
that through the contract process, a proper balance will be achieved.4" The
focus of the theory, however, is not the balance that is struck, but rather, the
nature of the process by which it is achieved.4
The dilemma, as posed by contract theory, is "finding an institutional
framework that can facilitate the achievement of the requisite degree of social
cooperation while at the same time preserve each individual's right to pursue
his or her conception of the good. 42 The objective is to create an institutional framework; subjective individuality post-dates this developmental
process, because an institutionalframework must inspire the mutual consent
of all.43 A universal individuality is postulated, one that is equated with and

38. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 790.
39. See id. at 776-84.
40. RAWLs, supra note 10, at 11.
41. See id. at 11-14.
42. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 790. The concept of "the good" concerns the motives of
parties to the social contract. A "good" for an individual is an object that has the properties that
it is rational for someone with a rational plan of life to want. RAwLs, supra note 10, at 399.
43. Consentprovides an objective source oflegitimacy; objectivity enables universal appeal.
Consider the nature of consent:
One of the important implications of the consent theory of moral obligation is, then,
that the act of obedience to law is not, in and of itself, morally obligatory or morally
right, since it requires association with an act of consent to become morally
obligatory, or an act which individuals morally ought to perform. In other words,
by consenting to obey the law, individuals may be said to turn an act that was
previously morally indifferent or optional into an act they are morally responsible
for performing.
The use of a commitment model of moral obligation as a means of defining
the meaning of political obligation conforms in important respects to the liberalinspired distinction between law and morality and legal obligation and moral
obligation. Since laws are said not to be associated intrinsically with a moral
obligation of obedience, it logically follows that a moral obligation to obey the law
must have its source in conduct external to the law itself. The act of consenting thus
represents an act external to the law itself that is capable of establishing a moral
obligation to obey the law, thereby bridging the initial gap between what we are
legally required to do and what we are morally required to do.
JULES STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSENT 12 (1978).
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limited to self-interest with respect to primary social and economic goods."
The purposes for seeking cooperative arrangements are similarly limited to
those things which the universal individual seeks, again, primary social and
economic goods.45
Initially, one must identify the nature of the contract. At the
microsocietal level 46 contracts may rightly reflect the subjectivity of their
makers. Freedom of contract in a purely microsocietal context, however, is
not a guarantor of a balance between individuality and interdependence.
Instead it merely mirrors the inequalities of the state of nature, in that having
something with which to bargain is similar to having physical might. Both
yield power for the pursuit of self-interest. To achieve such a balance
between individuality and interdependence, microsocietal contract activity is
supplemented and constrained by a contractual structure at the macrosocietal
level.47 Macrosocietal contracting is the process by which individuals
develop a social contract.48 The social contract has two components: the
contract of association and the contract of government.49 Though philosophers put forth differing theories of their development, 0 certain generalizations may be made that illustrate the difference between the two components.
The contract of association is among individuals5 ' and represents those
principles designed to achieve a balance between the demands of individual
needs and those of coexistence. 2 The contract of government is between
individuals and the government and represents the institutional structure by
which the principles of association are implemented. 3 It is the process by
which the contract of association is formed that lends legitimacy to law. The
scope of that contract delineates the parameters of the law.

44. Primary goods are things that every rational person is presumed to want. Social primary
goods include such things as rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, and wealth. RAWLS,
supra note 10, at 62. "Other primary goods such as health and vigor, intelligence and
imagination, are natural goods; although theirpossession is influenced by the basic structure, they
are not so directly under its control." Id.
45. Id.
46. In his article, Rosenfeld distinguishes between micro and macrosocietal levels of
contract. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 791. The microsocietal, or private contract, is based on

"individual needs and desires that remain by and large opaque to all but their possessor." Id. at
817-18. The macrosocietal, or collective contract, is "not based on any particular individual need
or desire, but on the autonomy of all individuals who possess different needs and desires." Id.

at 818.
47. See supra note 46.
48. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 794.
49. Id. at 863-64.
50. Id. at 864. Rosenfeld explains that Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all conceive of the
social contract as encompassing the contract of association and the contract of government. Id.
at 864. They differ in the treatment of the relationship between those two components. Id.; see
generally id. at 864-69. These differences are beyond the scope of this Comment.
51. Id. at 863-64.
52. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 11.
53. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 863-69.
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The scope is derivative of certain procedural premises within the
contracting process. These procedural premises stem from the concept of pure
procedural justice. 4 According to Rosenfeld, "'[P]ure procedural justice'
does not require an independent criterion of justice for its validity. In this
context, the outcome is just, provided that a fair procedure was properly
followed."5" Thus the outcome is not just simply by virtue of the fact that
a contract was made. Rather, it is a function of the fairness of the procedure.
In order for a procedural model to be capable of universal legitimacy, the
procedure must neutralize any elements in the contract process that would
allow individual differences to compromise fairness by influencing the terms
of the agreement. Thus the procedural model posits the significance of the
concept of the universal individual in the contractual process. 6 Creating a
contractual situation capable of universal experience provides background
fairness, 7 enabling pure procedural justice. Background fairness involves a
theoretical construct in which the influence of individual differences is
removed from the initial contractual situation. A universally acceptable
contractual situation is crucial to establishing the universal legitimacy of the
process and the result, in addition to the permissible scope of societal rules
and structural arrangements. The legitimacy of any contract, but especially the
social contract, arises from consent. 8 In order for consent to provide a
sound and continuing basis for popular legitimacy and thus system stability,
and in order to be consistent with the notion of background fairness, consent
must have representational59 and generational6" validity. The structure of
that initial contractual situation is as follows:
The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that
any principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure
procedural justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the
effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to
exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in
order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of
ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their

Id. at 781.
Id.
See supra notes 59-61.
See supra notes 59, 61.
See Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 780-81, 818-19.
59. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 139. Because it simply is not feasible to involve every
individual inthe contracting process, those individuals who are involved must possess only those
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

characteristics and that self-awareness that may be attributed to all individuals. By neutralizing
individual differences, the consent of the participating individuals may properly be attributed to
those who did not participate.
60. Id. at 137. Generational validity is related to the concept of representational validity;
generations that follow the contracting event may rightly be considered to have consented to the
agreement. Later generations are protected by the utilization of the universal individual: "[the
parties] must choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live with
whatever generation they turn out to belong to." Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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obliged to evaluate principles solely on the
own particular case and they
S• are 61
basis of general considerations.
Use of objective, universal individuals as the representative contracting parties,
combined with the limitation on knowledge of natural and social circumstances, renders a contractual result that enjoys popular legitimacy based on the
nature of the procedure alone.
IV. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE INADEQUACIES OF

CURRENT APPROACHES
An understanding of the procedural framework is a prerequisite to
discussion of the legal and political systems, because it provides the only
objectively defensible basis for analyzing the content and scope of the organic
law as well as the positive law derived therefrom. An understanding of the
derivation of law that creates government is essential because it is the source
of any limitations on the scope of law created by government. To illustrate
the import of this theoretical approach on the interpretation of law created by
government one may compare the interpretive approach taken by the judiciary
in the context of a particular area of the law. The doctrine of Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process provides a useful focus for analysis.
A. The Bill of Rights as Organic Law
Initially one might quarrel with the characterization of the Bill of Rights
as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment as organic law. It is clear
that the Bill of Rights, like the Constitution, can be understood as a social
contract. It is less clear whether it is better described as a contract of
association or a contract of government.62 The distinction, however, is
irrelevant. Both types of contract may be interpreted as "organic law"
according to familiar definitions of the term.63 Within the procedural model,
organic law specifically implicates and concerns the contract of association,

61. Id. at 136-37. The veil of ignorance is the method by which individual differences are
neutralized in the situation of the original position.
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I
shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their
special psychological propensities. The principles ofjustice are chosen behind a veil
of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice
of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social
circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles
to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair
agreement or bargain.
Id. at 12.
62. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
63. Organic law has been defined as the system of laws or principles forming the foundation
of government. READER'S DIGEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 951 (1977).
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for it is that process which shapes the contract of government. Nevertheless,
because the contract of government derives from the contract of association,
it is itself organic law. Moreover, one may recall that an essential distinction
between the two contracts is that the contract of association represents the
terms of cooperation among individuals, while the contract of government is
an agreement between individuals and government.' The terms of the Bill
of Rights contemplate limitations on government with respect to the rights of
individuals. This echoes the definition of a contract of government.
However, one must also consider the function of government in determining
the nature of an agreement between individuals and government. Government
may operate as a coordinated group of individuals charged with the task of
fashioning law, or as a coercive apparatus independent from and incapable of
representing the discrete interests of individuals or groups. When government
exceeds its role as a coercive authority enforcing the terms of the contract of
association,6" for example, by creating laws that do not operate in an
objectively neutral manner or the purpose of which exceeds that required for
the continued operation of government in its coercive role, it is acting in the
capacity of an association of individuals. When government contracts to
protect rights, as in the Bill of Rights, it is acting as a group of individuals.
Thus, the Bill of Rights is not a contract between individuals and government,
but a contract among individuals; the rights there preserved are created not by
government as a coercive apparatus but by government as an empowered
association of individuals. In this respect, then, the Bill of Rights is organic
law.
B. Substantive Due Process
The scope, or very existence, of substantive protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is the subject of disagreement
among legal philosophers.' The relevant provision mandates, "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ... ,7 The more narrow interpretation of the clause is that, as against
states, individuals are to receive procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty or property.6" The prevailing interpretation is that
the provision creates an area of substantive protection from deprivation of life,
liberty and property that procedural process alone cannot secure.69 Within
this interpretation there is disagreement as to the source of the substantive
protection. Some theorists argue that only those rights contained in the

64. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
65. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 878-79 n.500.
66. See generallyLouis Henkin, Privacyand Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974).
Henkin follows an ongoing tug-of-war among the various factions on the Supreme Court that
support different interpretations as to the existence and degree of substantive due process
protection under the 14th Amendment.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 n.* (1965) (White, J., concurring).
69. Henkin, supra note 66 at 1418.
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Constitution and thos6 enumerated in the Bill of Rights are to receive
substantive protection from state deprivation." Other commentators posit a
theory of selective incorporation, suggesting that only those rights enumerated
in the first eight amendments (in addition to those listed in the Constitution)
should receive substantive protection. 7' These writers sometimes build on
that textual base by recognizing penumbras, areas of substantive protection
that emanate from the textual protections.72 Other scholars propose a theory
of substantive due process that is not wed to the words of the Constitution or
Bill of Rights." To them, the source of substantive protection is conceived
in terms of broad allusions to justice or to rights embedded in the history and
tradition of our political culture.74 The Supreme Court has fluctuated
between embracing selective incorporation 75 and the more ethereal concept
of substantive due process.76 Substantive due process is a particularly
appropriate issue for this analysis in that the legitimacy of applying a
substantive due process analysis to determine the validity of state law depends
upon the source of the protection. As it is a provision of the organic law, the
procedural model of organic law development provides an independent and
objectively legitimate source for determining the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process protection of life, liberty, and property.
The Supreme Court's approach to the interpretation of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights reveals the inadequacies of any approach that deviates
from the postulated procedural model. A few case examples are useful to
demonstrate these inadequacies.77 The issues presented in the case examples
involve due process protection of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In such cases the Court must determine the appropriate balance between
individual liberty and the needs and desires of the societal majority and/or the
government. Several flaws in the Court's approach are revealed in its
attempts to reconcile liberty with state police power. These flaws include a
misconception of the nature of the social contract, the use of malleable and
inconsistently applied standards, and a misguided and inappropriate concern
for matters of governmental structure, specifically including the misapprehension of the role of the judiciary in the constitutional structure and a misplaced
concern for federalism.

70. See, e.g., Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &Gynecologists, 476 U.S.

747, 789-90 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482, 484 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
73. Henkin, supra note 66, at 1418.
74. See Griswold,381 U.S. at 511-12, n.4 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (opinion of White, J.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
168 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).

75. See supra note 71.
76. See supra note 74.
77. See supra note 1.
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C. Cases to Be Examined
In Jacobsonv. Massachusetts,78 the Court determined that a Massachusetts statute requiring citizens to receive smallpox vaccinations 79 did not
violate the substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 80
The Court noted that there is a "sphere within which the individual may assert

the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any

human government, especially of any free government existing under a written
constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will."'
The majority
considered the concept of the social compact and the need for a balance
between individual rights and the common good.82 The Court's solution to
the problem of balancing these demands was to determine that the rule of the
societal majority represented the correct balance:
In a free country, where the government is by the people, through their
chosen representatives, practical legislation admits of no other standard of
action; for what the people believe is for the common welfare must be
accepted
as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does in fact
83
or not.

The Court further based its holding on the idea that the individual who
chooses to remain a part of the community must conform to the dictates of the
majority.'
In light of the facts, it is difficult to quarrel with the disposition of the
case. The Court noted that when the regulation vas adopted, smallpox was
"prevalent to some extent" in the area and that "the disease was increasing."8 5
A further explanation of the result in Jacobsonis that in the area of physical
liberty the demands of coexistence necessarily impose more restraints, for
exercises of physical liberty are more likely to encroach upon the liberty of
other individuals in modem conditions of coexistence. This explanation falters
and ultimately fails when reference is had to the following cases in which the
Court has sanctioned state legislation in the area of morality.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,6 the Court upheld a Georgia statute that
criminalized private consensual homosexual sodomy. 7 The Court's framing
of the issue is significant.
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against
sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in
78. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 38.
Id. at29.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 35.

84. id. at 37-38.
85. Id. at 27.

86. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

87. Id. at 196.
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particular, are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right or
propriety of state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize
homosexual sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on
state constitutional grounds. The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time. The case also
calls for some judgment about the limits of the Court's role in carrying out
its constitutional mandate."'
The Court proceeded to identify those rights that it previously had recognized
as fundamental rights: family, marriage, and procreation. 89 An attempt to
analogize the right to privacy associated with consensual homosexual sodomy
to these protected rights failed to receive judicial approval."

The Court then considered whether the right asserted was of the nature

of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection so as to become an
independent and additional protected right.9' Two theories of heightened
protection were considered. One theory considered would protect those
liberties that are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed."" A second theory
would protect those liberties that are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."'9" In refusing to extend these theories to protect the asserted
right, the Court focused its analysis on past legal treatment of the conduct,
noting that "[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots."94 The
Court found that such a history of negative legal treatment indicated that the
right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy is not deeply rooted in
history and tradition nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 95 Further,
the Court noted its resistance to expanding the rights protected by the
Constitution and Bill of Rights: "The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."96 Finally, the Court indicated that the belief of a majority of the
electorate provided a rational basis on which to uphold the constitutionality of
the statute.97
In Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court held that a statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional as applied, where
the statute was applied to married persons. Initially the Court delineated the

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.
95.

96.
97.

Id. at 190.
Id. at 190-91.
Id.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 196.

98. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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perceived parameters of its authority: "[w]e do not sit as a super-legislature
to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions."'
The Court, however,
found license to question the validity of the statute because the statute
"operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife.""
The
majority supported its decision to so protect the marital relationship by finding
0
that marital privacy falls within a penumbra of specific textual guarantees. '
The Court wrote, "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."'0 2 The majority opinion concluded that the marital relationship
lay "within a zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." 10 3 In a final justification for its decision, the Court appealed
to history and tradition and to something bordering on natural law:
"We
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred."' °5
The case of Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists"° concerned a statute which imposed certain conditions on the
right to choose abortion.0 7 The Court invalidated portions of the act that
too severely burdened the decision to abort.0" The Court focused on the
intimate nature of the decision:
Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision-with the guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in
Roe-whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice
freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect

99. Id.at 482.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 484.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 485.
104. The concept of natural law is far too complicated to be treated here. A brief overview
will suffice for this discussion. As used here the meaning of natural law is that of natural rights:
those which grow out of the nature of humankind and depend upon their personality, and are
distinguished from those which are created by positive laws created by a duly constituted
government to create an orderly society. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1026 (6th ed. 1990).
Natural law signifies the laws that reflect human nature. Id. The concept looks to the state of
nature for illumination, for in that state people "were governed solely by a rational and consistent
obedience to the needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature .... " Id. Definitions of
natural law also include ethical and religious components. See id.

105. Griswold, 479 U.S. at 486.
106. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
107. Id. at 750.

108. Id. at 762, 767-68.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 58

inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees
equally to all. 1' 9
The Court made allusions to the notion of a private sphere of individual
liberty to be kept largely beyond the reach of government." ° A further
portion of the opinion indicated that disagreement with the principles behind
protected rights provided no basis for infringing on or denying such
rights.'
D. Discussion
It is clear that the Court has misconstrued the nature of the social
compact. The Court appears tom between two approaches to achieving
legitimacy and stability, one seemingly procedural and one substantive, and
ultimately tries to blend the two. This approach is incapable of universal
integrity. The Court's analysis of liberty issues incorporates that component
of the procedural model that most significantly contributes to universal
legitimacy: consent. The social compact is a contract; any analysis of that
process that ignores consent would be a gross misinterpretation. Though the
Court recognizes the significance of consent, it frustrates the potential for
universal validity by allowing substantive considerations to infiltrate its
conception of a consensual process.
The notion of consent is incorporated into the Court's analysis in several
ways. Consent is implicit in the concept of a majority. The Court specifically
relies on the opinion of the societal majority as a basis for its holdings in
Jacobson"2 and, to some degree, Bowers."3 Consent is also a factor in
an analysis that relies on "history and tradition" as support for the treatment
accorded an asserted right, as was the case in Bowers"4 and Griswold."5
A practice that is so prevalent as to become "deeply rooted" in history and6
tradition is one that has received the consent of the societal majority.'
Finally, consent is implicated in an analysis that considers whether a given
practice is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' 7 Where this is the
standard, that which is deeply rooted in history and tradition generally
determines what is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as in Bowers.
While the Court seems to recognize the validity of a procedural approach,
wherein legitimacy is the function of consent, the consensual model it adopts,
majority rule, is impure, and thus incapable of securing universally-recognized

109. Id. at 772.
110. Id.

111. Id. at 759, 771-72.

112. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
113. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
114. Id. at 192.
115. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.

116. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
117. Id. at 191-92.
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legitimacy for the system." 8 Where the procedure is one that determines the
organizing principles of a group, i.e. organic law, majority rule is incapable
of providing legitimacy and stability, for there is no fundamental structure to
fall back on to provide legitimacy. Where the procedure is one that creates
organizing principles and structure, consent must be universal; it must carry
representational and generational validity. 9 The concept of a majority,
however, is not capable of that, for it implies knowledge of advantages and
disadvantages for oneself and others as well as awareness of subjective needs,
desires and beliefs beyond those related to primary social and economic goods.
The term further implies the preexistence of political theory, a development
which should post-date the social contract in order for the contract to be
capable of objective integrity.
The acceptance of majority rule as the embodiment of the balance
between individual and community needs incorporates subjective criteria into
thp organic law and thus cannot foster universal legitimacy. The Jacobson
Court suggested that consent may be implied by an individual's choice to
Such reasoning presumes that individuremain a part of the community.'
als may choose to live outside the social compact, when in fact all available
land has been divided into political subunits and all individuals are imbued
with citizenship in at least one political system from birth.
Insofar as the Court requires a textual link with an asserted right, it
further undermines the integrity of its appeal to consent as a source of
legitimacy. Consider the Griswold opinion. The Court needed some relation
to a textual liberty in order to afford constitutional protection to an activity;
Although penumbras
it used the notion of penumbras to provide the link.

118. Traditional contract theorists, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, accept the idea of
majority rule. However, they incorporate majority rule as a method for decision-making only
after the contract of association has been agreed upon. Consider the following excerpts.
Indeed, if there were no earlier agreement, then how, unless the election were
unanimous, could there be any obligation on the minority to accept the decision of
the majority? What right have the hundred who want to have a master to vote on
behalf of the ten who do not? The law of majority-voting itself rests on a covenant,
and implies that there has been on at least one occasion unanimity.
RoussEAu, supra note 14, at 59.
[B]ecause the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he
that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the
actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily
entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared
thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part
should ordayne ....
HOBBES, supra note 14, at 122.
When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein
the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 164-65.
119. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
120. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37-38.
121. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
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furnish more flexibility than strict textualism, any approach that is wedded to
the text nullifies the possibility of generationally-valid consent by freezing the
interpretation of the contract temporally.
A second way in which the Court has misconstrued the nature of the
social compact is found in its incorporation of purely subjective and
substantive standards into the analysis. The Court seeks to discern whether
a given activity is a "fundamental right."'" A more objective approach
might inquire as to whether an activity constitutes, simply, a right. Such an
approach has the merit of being less open to subjective manipulation than an
analysis that seeks to find a fundamental right. Both approaches, however,
incorporate subjective and substantive elements that render universal validity
an impossibility. In Bowers, the Court spoke of liberties that are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed.""
Much debate could be had over the
meaning of liberty, ordered liberty, and justice. In Griswold, the Court, in an
apparent allusion to natural law, noted the sacred nature of the marital
relationship. 24 The concept of natural law is perhaps the conception of law
that is least capable of eliciting universal consent. Natural law conceives of
human instincts and rationality, of ethics, of religion, and of realities of
existence in the state of nature. These are conceptions that are not universal
and are capable of subjective manipulation."z
A final area in which the Court has misconstrued the nature of the social
contract and its process, and again diverged from the procedural model,
concerns what it conceives as the norm and the exception concerning the
appropriate balance of rights among societal actors. The Bowers Court
required that an activity constitute a fundamental right as a condition to its
receiving constitutional protection.' 26 In Griswold and Thornburgh, the
Court recognized an area of privacy that is to receive constitutional protection.
In order to be protected, the right must either be fundamental or fall
within that sphere of privacy. This right is considered to be the exception
rather than the norm. These approaches essentially place a burden of proof
on the person asserting the right; it must be of a certain nature in order to be
protected. This conflicts with social contract theory and the procedural model.
If the individual precedes organized society, and subsequently contracts as to
the terms of coexistence, it would seem logical that individual liberty is, in
fact, the normative experience, while the constraints to which one contracts
would constitute the exceptional experience. A contract is used to alter the
normal state of things. The burden of showing a certain quality, then, should
be on the party attempting to restrict individual liberty.
A second flaw in the judicial approach to interpreting liberty issues under
the substantive due process framework concerns the Court's use of malleable

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
Id. at 191-92.
Griswold,381 U.S. at 486.
See supra note 104.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772; Griswold,381 U.S. at 482.
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standards and its inconsistent application of those standards. For example, the
four cases discussed in this Comment illustrate four different standards.
Further, one single standard could not be used in each of the cases discussed
and result in the same decisions. The history and tradition standard might
yield the same result in Bowers and Griswold. Homosexual activity has not
However, the sanctity
been a sanctioned activity in United States history.'
of the marital relationship does have a legitimizing historical basis. 9 In
Jacobson,however, one could argue that physical body autonomy is rooted in
history and tradition, using the standard to overturn the statute. In
Thornburgh, the Court invalidated portions of the statute, 3 ° yet the activity
threatened by the statute, abortion, has not been clearly protected in history
Moreover, even the same standard is capable of inconsisand tradition.'
tent application. Consider the history and tradition standard. The Bowers
court upheld the statute because the behavior proscribed by the statute was
In Griswold, the Court
similarly proscribed in history and tradition.'
applied the history and tradition test not to the activity at issue, the use of
contraceptives, but to the relationship burdened by the statute, that of husband
and wife.'
There is clearly far too much potential for subjective
manipulation as to the activity or relationship to find legitimacy in history and
tradition. The cases illustrate that the Court, in approaching the interpretation
of organic law as it would approach law created by government, has left
organic law without a legitimizing basis in theory and history. Rather, it
changes its dimensions with the changes in majority politics. Thus, current
constitutional jurisprudence is incapable of lending universal validity to the
Constitution and Bill of Rights.
A final flaw in the Court's approach to substantive due process issues
involves its misplaced concern for matters of government structure. The
Griswold and Bowers opinions indicate that the Court feels constrained in its
authority to protect individual liberty by the doctrines of separation of powers
and federalism.' 34 However, the relevant conflict is not one between state
and federal government, nor is it among the branches of government. In
allowing itself to be constrained by these concerns, the Court misinterprets its
own role within the constitutional structure. There are several possible
constructs of societal conflict: majority versus individual, majority and state
versus individual,state versus individual, and state versus majority. The only
situation in which a political remedy is available is that of the state versus the
majority. The sole source of protection for the remaining societal conflicts,
those involving the individual, must lie in the judiciary. The political system
provides no vindication of the rights of individuals when the assertion of those
rights conflicts with those of the state or the majority. The structure of the

128.
129.
130.
131.

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-43 (1973).

132. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
133. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
134. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
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Constitution is such that the judiciary is to provide a check on law-making
bodies.' 35 The Supreme Court is then incorrect in conceiving the judiciary's
role as one of accepting and condoning what the majority believes is in the
common interest. 3 If justice is, indeed, a proper balance between the
demands of man's individual nature and those of coexistence, there can be no
such balance when the system removes meaningful consideration of the
demands of man's individual nature.
In addition to the differences discussed above, perhaps the most
significant judicial divergence from the procedural model is evident in the
model's treatment of the sample cases. Under the procedural model, organic
law is valid only if it would be agreed to by everyone.'37 Thus the reach
of organic law and its derivatives extends only to those areas to which a
universal individual would contract. Where a given subject matter or activity
enjoys anything less than universal consensus as to its propriety, it is beyond
the scope of the law.'38 That which is within the scope of the law consists
of the aspects of individual liberty that the universal individual would sacrifice
for the greater benefits and protections offered by coexistence. Anything
beyond those sacrifices cannot be said to be attributable to all individuals.
Thus, the model affords the maximum protection to an individual consistent
with an equal amount of protection to other individuals.
The Jacobson case poses no difficult issues for either approach. The
decision must be to uphold the statute. The statute regulates to protects the
physical health of citizens; the risk is one that is aggravated by coexistence.
It is a proper area for legal 'regulation. One of the motivating circumstances
Safety is
of coexistence is to provide a means of protection from others.'
within the scope of the social contract to the extent that what one person does
affects the safety of others. The significant difference between the judicial
approach and the procedural model lies in the treatment of cases such as
Bowers, Griswold and Thornburgh, which involve statutes that regulate
morality. Morality is an ultimately subjective and substantive paradigm. No
conception of morality is capable of universal integrity. Further, moral
convictions do not constitute an area that individuals necessarily yield to group
control when the path of coexistence is taken. Under the procedural model,

then, any piece of morality legislation would be void. Thus, the most
significant impact of the procedural model would be to limit the legitimate
scope of the operation of law.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See U.S. CoNsT. art. III.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196; see, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 136-37.
See generallyRAwLs, supra note 10.
See supra note 14.
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V. CONCLUSION

A procedural model provides the more appropriate analysis for conflicts
between individual liberty and the common good.
It must be remembered that the parties to the social contract have as their
objective the preservation of as much individual autonomy as is consistent
with the social and political institutions designed to guarantee the kind of
cooperation necessitated by the individual's lack of self-sufficiency ....
Accordingly, the contract of association should create an institutional
framework that allows the individual the greatest possible autonomy and
control over40the actual terms of his or her direct cooperation with other
individuals.

Indeed, the procedural model is the preferred framework for approaching any
issue of intra-organizational conflict. A system based in contract at both the
micro and macrosocietal levels enables cooperation that is a function of the
pursuit of individual nature. The concepts of right and legitimacy, those
theoretical bases of a societal organization that facilitate its stability and
perpetuation, grow out of universal individuals' pursuit of self-interest. The
ignorance of the contracting parties as to subjective conceptions of self and
society provides legitimacy for the theoretical supposition of representational
and generational consent. From the limitation on the hypothesized pursuits of
humans to those things universally needed or desired one can derive the
objectively permissible scope of the social contract. Thus the resolution of
societal conflicts among individuals, government, and majorities need pose no
threat to system stability where the principles for their resolution are derived
from the procedural model.
KATHRYN N. BENSON

140. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 878.
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